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1 Introduction 
Over the last 40 years most economies in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) have been 
characterized by exchange rate instability, financial fragility and high inflation. The 
continent as a whole is the furthest from achieving the UNDP’s Millennium 
Development Goals, and seems to be diverging from rather than converging on the 
industrialized world (Easterly and Levine 1997; World Bank 2003). Many SSA 
countries are economically very small, and it is possible that one factor handicapping 
African economic development is the absence of opportunities to exploit economies of 
scale in production and trade. For this reason, the promotion of macroeconomic 
integration in SSA is, if anything, even more urgent than elsewhere in the world. 
One possible route to greater macroeconomic integration is the formation of monetary 
unions. In fact, there is a part of Africa – the African Financial Community (CFA) – in 
which a monetary union has existed for over half a century. At present, the CFA 
comprises 14 different countries formed into two monetary unions, the West African 
Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA) and the Union of Central African States 
(UDEAC). In each of these two areas there is a single currency and a single central 
bank. 
Many African governments are now entertaining the possibility of emulating or 
attaching themselves to this zone. Most recently, as documented by Bawumia (2002), 
the Lomé meeting of ECOWAS heads of state in 1999 set out detailed plans for regional 
monetary integration among both francophone and anglophone states in West Africa. 
The ultimate aim envisaged in these plans is a merging of the UEMOA with a yet to be 
created anglophone monetary union, by as early as 2004. The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-
Conakry, Nigeria and Sierra Leone have agreed to create a Second Monetary Zone by 
July 2005. The institutional characteristics of this zone reflect some of the existing 
features of the UEMOA: an independent common central bank, no monetary financing 
for the public sector, pooled forex reserves and a stabilization fund to cushion 
temporary balance of payments shocks. 
A widening of monetary union in West Africa could entail two benefits for the new 
member states. First (and beyond the scope of this paper), the autonomy of a trans-
national central bank could make low inflation a time-consistent monetary policy goal. 
Second, the common currency could lead to a greater degree of macroeconomic 
integration, for reasons outlined below. Some aspects of integration, such as increased 
trade volumes or lower relative price variability, can reasonably be expected to increase 
welfare directly. Others, such as a greater degree of business cycle correlation, will 
mitigate the potential welfare losses resulting from a single monetary policy described 
by Mundell (1961). 
In the light of these policy developments, we will assess the extent to which the existing 
monetary unions in West Africa and Equatorial Africa have already facilitated a greater 
degree of macroeconomic integration than could otherwise be expected, conditional on 
the geographical proximity and production structure of the member states. We focus on 
this small part of the world for two reasons. First, previous authors have looked at the 
correlation between exchange rate regimes and macroeconomic integration, but 
typically in the context of global data sets in which the effects estimated represent 
global averages. These averages might not reflect the experience of the poorest parts of 
the globe. Second, in our data set we are confident, for reasons given below, that   2
selection for membership of the monetary unions has so far been exogenous to the 
countries’ economic characteristics. (This assumption is much more questionable in 
global data sets.) So it is reasonable to interpret any difference in the extent of 
integration within the CFA from the regional average as a product of the CFA 
institutions themselves. The estimated difference will give us some idea of the 
magnitude of the increased integration that a wider monetary union might bring. 
The following section has two purposes: first to survey the ways in which a monetary 
union might lead to greater macroeconomic integration, and second to relate these 
mechanisms to the institutional characteristics of the existing CFA. This will provide a 
basis for constructing a model to test the impact that the CFA has had on 
macroeconomic integration over the last 30 years. 
2  Monetary union and macroeconomic integration in theory and practice 
2.1 Theoretical  background 
The existing literature suggests at least three aspects of international economic 
integration that could in principle be affected by membership of a monetary union. A 
common theme that emerges is that the benefits of a fixed bilateral exchange rate are 
augmented by full monetary union. 
(i)  The absence of unanticipated shocks to bilateral nominal exchange rates will 
reduce the risks involved in international trade. The value of exports (or the cost of 
imports) in terms of local currency will be easier to predict. There already exists a 
literature documenting the impact of nominal exchange rate risk on trade; see for 
example Thursby and Thursby (1987).1 A monetary union precludes any nominal 
exchange rate fluctuations, and should facilitate more trade. Moreover, the use of a 
common currency will eliminate currency transactions costs in international trade 
(De Grauwe 2000), so trade volumes ought to increase. This second effect is 
specific to full monetary union, as opposed to an ordinary fixed exchange rate 
regime. 
(ii)  Fixed exchange rates can reduce real exchange rate volatility. If there is any inertia 
in domestic commodity prices, shocks to the nominal exchange rate will lead to 
deviations from purchasing power parity. This is a key element of the exchange 
rate overshooting models that evolved out of Dornbusch (1976). Moreover, a full 
monetary union could lead to even lower real exchange rate volatility than a fixed 
exchange rate system. Engel and Rogers (2001) identify a number of factors that 
determine the degree of real exchange rate volatility between pairs of countries.2 
Nominal exchange rate volatility and physical distance turn out to be important 
factors, but there is also a substantial ‘pure’ border effect. Controlling for all other 
factors, the ratio of prices in two regions is more volatile if the regions are located 
                                                 
1  However, it is important to acknowledge that in a general equilibrium setting fixed exchange rates do 
not necessarily lead to more trade. See Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2000).  
2  Related papers on this theme include Lothian and Taylor (1996) and Papell (1997).   3
in different countries. Engel and Rogers suggest a number of explanations for this 
effect. Some of these, including the currency transactions costs mentioned above, 
but also factors such as international heterogeneity in marketing and distribution 
systems, the scope for international price discrimination, or ‘informal’ trade 
barriers, might be reduced if the countries shared a common currency.3  
(iii)  As a consequence of increased trade, the degree of business cycle synchronicity 
between two countries in a monetary union might be higher, because aggregate 
demand shocks in one country have more of an impact on the other than they 
would otherwise; or it might be lower, because increased trade corresponds to 
increased specialization in types of production subject to different productivity 
shocks. But an increased volume of bilateral trade is not the only way in which a 
common currency could affect business cycle synchronicity. For example, if 
multinational firms have less scope for price discrimination between members of a 
monetary union (because price differences are more transparent and because the 
elimination of currency transactions costs facilitates arbitrage in goods), then 
international productivity shocks are likely to be passed on to local markets in a 
more uniform way. Papers looking at the relationship between business cycle 
synchronicity an exchange rate regimes include Artis and Zhang (1995), 
Christodoulakis et al. (1995), Fatas (1996) and Boone (1997). 
In this paper, we will examine the three dimensions of integration noted above: trade 
intensity, real exchange rate volatility and business cycle synchronicity. The data set we 
will use comprises most of the countries of the CFA Franc Zone, plus most of their 
immediate neighbours with floating exchange rates or adjustable pegs. As we explain 
below, this gives us the opportunity to examine the effects both of fixed exchange rates 
per se and of full monetary union. 
2.2  The CFA Franc zone: institutional background 
The CFA evolved from the monetary institutions of the last phase of French colonial 
Africa. Figure 1 shows a map of the CFA region. The two monetary areas have different 
currencies. The UEMOA uses currency issued by the Central Bank of West African 
States (BCEAO); the UDEAC uses currency issued by the Bank of Central African 
States (BEAC). Somewhat confusingly, both currencies are commonly called the CFA 
Franc. 
The countries that make up the CFA, and their basic economic structure, are 
summarized in Table 1. The boundaries between the different monetary areas have a 
geographical and historical basis, and each of the two monetary unions (the UEMOA 
and UDEAC regions) comprises a wide range of economies, as indicated by the 
descriptive statistics in Table 2. The UEMOA region includes both semi-industrialized 
economies with a high export-GDP ratio (such as Côte d’Ivoire and Senegal) and also 
some of the world’s poorest and underdeveloped countries (such as Burkina Faso and 
Mali). The UDEAC region includes both countries that are equally underdeveloped 
                                                 
3  For example, traders’ lives will be made easier if they only have to hold one type of currency with 
which to bribe customs officials.   4
(Chad, Central African Republic and Equatorial Guinea) and relatively high-income 
petroleum exporters (Cameroon, Congo Republic and Gabon). 
Each of the two currencies is exchangeable for the French Franc at a rate of 100:1 (and 
now at the equivalent Euro rate). The French Treasury is obliged to exchange CFA 
Francs for Euros at this fixed rate,4 and there are rules limiting CFA government 
borrowing that are intended to prevent the African countries from abusing France’s 
guarantee of convertibility. However, France is not part of the CFA, and the only legal 
tender in each CFA country is the currency issued by its central bank. Foreign currency 
(including other CFA currency) is not used as a unit of account or medium of exchange. 
Commercial banks do not typically offer customers foreign currency deposit facilities, 
and foreign currency deposits are a negligibly small fraction of total deposits. The 
exchange of one CFA currency for another (or of CFA Francs for Euros) must be 
conducted through the central bank and, is subject to taxation, so intra-CFA currency 
transactions costs are not negligible (Vizy 1989). 
Figure 1 
The CFA franc zone and its neighbours 
The dark shaded area is the UEMOA; the light shaded area is the UDEAC 
 
 
1 = Benin; 2 = Burkina Faso; 3 = Côte d’Ivoire; 4 = Guinea-Bissau; 5 = Mali; 6 = Niger;  
7 = Senegal; 8 = Togo; 9 = Cameroon; 10 = C.A.R.; 11 = Chad; 12 = Congo Republic;  
13 = Gabon; 14 = Equatorial Guinea; Ga = Gambia; Gh = Ghana; Gu = Guinea-Conakry;  
L = Liberia; M = Mauritania; N = Nigeria; S = Sierra Leone 
                                                 
4  In effect, France pegs the Euro to the CFA currencies. Monetary policy in the CFA is constrained not 
by the need to maintain an exchange rate peg, but by (very lax) rules limiting domestic credit creation.    5
Table 1 
Monetary groupings in the CFA 
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Summary statistics for CFA countries and their neighbours 
 Gross  national 
income (US$bn) 






ben  2.3 0.37  0.38  0.14 
bfa  2.4 0.21  0.35  0.17 
cam  8.6 0.58  0.44  0.20 
car  1.0 0.28  0.55  0.20 
civ  9.6 0.60  0.29  0.22 
cgo  1.7 0.57  0.05  0.71 
gab  3.9 3.19  0.06  0.53 
mal  2.5 0.24  0.46  0.17 
ner  1.9 0.18  0.39  0.18 
sen  4.7 0.49  0.18  0.27 
tcd  1.5 0.20  0.39  0.14 
tgo  1.3 0.29  0.38  0.22 
gam  0.4 0.34  0.38  0.13 
gha  6.6 0.34  0.35  0.25 
mau  1.0 0.37  0.22  0.31 
nga  32.7 0.26  0.30  0.46 
Sle  0.6 0.13  0.47  0.30   6
The composition of the two monetary unions is a consequence of the French colonial 
organization, and is therefore exogenous to contemporary economic characteristics. The 
current grouping into two currency areas dates from 1955 (seven years before full 
political independence, at which point the countries were self-governing French 
overseas territories), and arises from the distinction between French West Africa and 
French Equatorial Africa in the colonial period. As can be seen from the map, this 
division is based on the physical geography of the region. The only point of physical 
contact between the UEMOA and the UDEAC is the Chad-Niger border, which lies in 
the Sahara Desert far from any major centers of population. Further south, the two areas 
are separated by Nigeria, a former British colony that has no part in the CFA. The CFA 
comprises those SSA countries occupied by France at the end of the First World War.5 
There have been just two exits from the CFA, neither of which is likely to have been 
correlated with the countries’ economic characteristics. In 1958, at the institution of the 
Fifth French Republic, all overseas territories participated in a referendum on the new 
constitution. Guinea-Conakry, which happened to have a socialist government at the 
time, was the only colony to reject this constitution, and severed all political and 
financial links with France. In 1973, after full independence, Mauritania (the only Arab 
country in the area) also exited the CFA, preferring to pursue an identity as a North 
African Arab state.6 There have also been just two entries: Equatorial Guinea and 
Guinea-Bissau. These countries were, respectively, Spanish and Portugese colonies; 
they are surrounded by, respectively, UDEAC and UEMOA nations, and joined the 
appropriate monetary union in 1985 and 1997. The only other countries surrounded by 
the CFA (Gambia, Ghana, Liberia, Nigeria and Sierra Leone) are all anglophone. All 
but Liberia were British colonies, and up until now it has been made clear that they are 
not welcome to join the francophone monetary area. 
So, if we look across the region depicted in Figure 1, we can see (i) pairs of countries 
sharing a single country (any two members of the UEMOA, or any two members of the 
UDEAC), (ii) pairs of countries with different currencies but a bilateral exchange rate 
that has been fixed for many decades (pairs made up of one UEMOA country and one 
UDEAC country), and (iii) pairs of countries for which the bilateral exchange rate has 
been variable (pairs in which at least one country is outside the CFA). The division 
between the two monetary unions within the CFA, and therefore the distinction between 
(i) and (ii), has been exogenous to economic characteristics. So also has membership of 
the CFA as a whole. If we assume (not implausibly) that the countries left outside the 
CFA with their own individual currencies have not been endowed with the political 
institutions necessary for a hard exchange rate peg to be a viable option, then the 
distinction between (i-ii) and (iii) has also been exogenous. So, using data from these 
countries relating to the three dimensions of integration outlined above, we have the 
opportunity to examine both the effects of a fixed exchange rate and the effects of a 
single currency on macroeconomic integration between pairs of countries in West 
Africa and Equatorial Africa.7 
                                                 
5  Excepting Djibouti, which is thousands of kilometres away in the Horn of Africa. 
6  Over the period covered by the empirical model in the next section, these two countries have lain 
outside the CFA. 
7  We ought to comment briefly on the reasons for restricting our geographical scope to just one part of 
Africa. First, the immediate policy relevance of our results is to the ECOWAS the CFA (two   7
3  Testing the impact of the CFA on macroeconomic integration 
In this section we focus on those 12 of the 14 members of the CFA for which adequate 
macroeconomic data are available: Benin (designated ben in the tables), Côte d’Ivoire 
(civ), Mali (mli), Niger (ner), Senegal (sen) and Togo (tgo) in the BCEAO area and 
Cameroon (cam), Central African Republic (car), Chad (tcd), Congo Republic (cgo) and 
Gabon (gab) in the BEAC region.8 We will examine various aspects of macroeconomic 
integration among these countries and their non-CFA neighbours. There are five non-
CFA countries in West Africa for which adequate data exist: Gambia (gam), Ghana 
(gha), Mauritania (mau), Nigeria (nga) and Sierra Leone (sle).9 Four of these are 
ECOWAS countries that might form part of an expanded monetary union in the very 
near future. The fifth (Mauritania) is a former CFA member that might well rejoin the 
UEMOA at a later date. 
One aim will be to identify the extent to which CFA membership has entailed a greater 
degree of integration (variously defined) than could otherwise have been expected. 
However, we will also make a distinction between the impact of common CFA 
membership and the impact of membership of the same monetary area (the UEMOA or 
the UDEAC). If sharing a common currency delivers an additional degree of integration 
over-and-above that arising from the common currency peg, then we should see a 
greater degree of integration within each of the two monetary unions than we do across 
the UEMOA-UDEAC border, conditional on other, exogenous economic 
characteristics. 
Our basic methodology is similar to that of Rose and Engel (2000), but with different 
dependent variables and a different data set. The extent of macroeconomic integration 
between two countries might depend on a variety of factors other than their currency 
institutions. So our approach is to construct a fixed-effects regression for different 
measures of integration in any two countries i and j, conditional on both a common 
currency dummy (ifsij) for country pairs within the UEMOA or within the UDEAC, a 
CFA membership dummy (ifzij) for pairs made up of any two CFA members (including 
UEMOA-UDEAC pairs), and a set of exogenous conditioning variables.  
In the empirical section that follows we will employ several different measures of 
integration. The first is the total value of bilateral trade between two countries, in US 
Dollars (Tij). The Tij figures used are taken from IMF DOTS, using data for 1981-2000. 
This corresponds to integration concept (i) in Section 2. Tij  ought to be higher in 
countries between which there is a nominal exchange rate peg, and perhaps even higher 
in those sharing the same currency. Since trade data are available for each individual 
year, it is in principle possible to construct a panel data set of bilateral trade flows. 
                                                                                                                                               
overlapping sets of countries), where the creation of a single monetary union is more than a remote 
possibility. Second, the distance between countries turns out to be an important factor for some of our 
integration measures. Within that part of Africa to which we restrict ourselves, distance effects are 
approximately linear. We suspect that this would not be true with a wider geographical scope, and our 
model already contains several non-linear effects. Including more countries would necessitate a more 
general functional form and – with limited data – more fragile results. 
8  The two countries lacking adequate data are Guinea-Bissau in the UEMOA region and Equatorial 
Guinea in the UDEAC region. National Accounts data for these countries exist for only a short time. 
9  The non-CFA countries in Figure 1 for which data are missing are Guinea-Conakry and Liberia.    8
However, there is likely to be a substantial degree of cross-sectional heterogeneity in 
such a panel, which will lead to biases of the kind discussed by Pesaran and Smith 
(1995). Since we are interested primarily in the determinants of the cross-sectional 
variation in the data, we will follow Pesaran and Smith and aggregate the trade flow 
data over time. In doing so, we will also allow for the possibility that the impact of CFA 
membership on trade was different in the 1980s from in the 1990s. The 1980s were a 
period of relatively high trade and foreign currency restrictions in SSA (excepting trade 
within the CFA); but in the 1990s, most countries’ trade regimes became very much 
more liberal. In the 1980s, CFA membership might have stimulated higher trade just 
because it acted as a restraint on distortionary trade policies. In the 1990s, with a 
reduction of regional trade barriers under the auspices of ECOWAS, this effect is likely 
to have been very much diminished, and any effect of the CFA on trade flows is more 
plausibly interpreted in terms of the factors outlined in (i-iii) above. So we will work 
with two dependent variables: Tij for the period 1981-1990 and Tij for the period 1991-
2000. 
The second, in the spirit of Engel and Rogers (2001), is a measure based on the real 
exchange rate. We will look at the extent to which prices in two countries are correlated. 
This corresponds to integration concept (ii) in Section 2. However, our focus will not be 
on an unconditional measure of real exchange rate correlation. In the short run, prices 
could vary in response to a wide variety of macroeconomic factors. For example, in the 
CFA the two different central banks can each pursue an active monetary policy. Interest 
parity with France does not hold in the short run, and the differential between each 
central bank’s base rate and that of the European Central Bank varies over time; so does 
the differential between the interest rates in the two parts of the CFA. The Euro-CFA 
Franc peg is guaranteed by the French Treasury, so short-run monetary policy in the 
CFA is not constrained by the need to maintain the peg. Idiosyncratic innovations in 
monetary policy could generate price deviations. Two countries in different currency 
areas might exhibit a large degree of heterogeneity in the movement of their real 
exchange rates not because using different currencies creates underlying structural 
asymmetries, but just because the two monetary authorities are following different 
policies. Conditioning out the monetary shocks might give a more informative indicator 
of the degree of underlying macroeconomic integration. Similarly, two countries might 
exhibit a high degree of real exchange rate correlation just because their terms of trade 
or productivity shocks are highly correlated, rather than because of anything to do with 
the factors outlined in concept (ii) in the previous section. 
For this reason we will look at the degree of conditional real exchange rate correlation 
between i and j. Our measure of correlation will be corr(ui
p, uj
p); ui
p is an innovation 







































































α β        (1) 
 
where pit is the log ratio of domestic prices (measured by the GDP deflator) to import 
prices (measured by the imports deflator in the National Accounts) for country i in year 
t. yit is the log of real GDP, mit the log of nominal M1 and xit the log of the terms of   9
trade (measured using export and import deflators in the National Accounts).10 β (.) is a 
3×3 and α (.) a 1×3 matrix of lag polynomial operators. The annual data used to 
construct the variables in the VAR are described in Appendix 1. 
This VAR is also used to construct the third measure of integration: the degree of 
business cycle synchronicity, corresponding to concept (iii) in Section 2. Here we are 
concerned with the measurement of the extent to which aggregate supply and aggregate 
demand shocks in one country are passed on to another. Again, we wish to condition on 
monetary policy: in the long run, money is neutral, but in the short run money shocks 
can impact on output. So the output shock correlations are measured as corr(ui
y, uj
y). 
These two correlation measures capture the degree of similarity in observed movements 
in the real exchange rate and in output at time t, conditional on their own past values, on 
the past values of M1 (which is probably endogenous to p and y) and on current and 
past movements in the terms of trade (which is exogenous in a small open economy). 
However, they do not quite represent correlations in shocks to the real exchange rate 
and to aggregate output. Equation (1) represents a reduced-form system that 
corresponds to a structural system in which contemporaneous movements in p, y and m 
interact with each other. The ui
p and ui
m are mixtures of structural shocks to p and y (and 
to m) in this system. So an alternative way of measuring real exchange rate and output 
correlations is to impose an identification structure on equation (1) so as to extract the 
structural shocks ε i
p and ε i
y, and then to measure the correlations corr(ε i





The identification structure we impose is based on the econometric methodology of 
Blanchard and Quah (1989), though with a different set of theory-based restrictions 
from those they use. Let Zit = [∆ pit ∆ yit ∆ mit]’ and uit = [uit
p uit
y uit
m]’. Then equation (1) 
can be re-written as a moving-average process: 
Zit – a(L)∆ xit  = (I – β (L))
-1uit         ( 2 )  
 
We can compare equation (2) with a moving-average representation of a putative 
structural model of the form: 
Zit – a(L)∆ xit  = γ (L)ε it        ( 3 )  
 
where ε it is a 1×3 vector of innovations to each of the structural equations. Identification 
the structural model requires the recovery of the 3×3 matrix γ (0): 
uit = γ (0)ε it           ( 4 )  
 
For this we need 3
2 = 9 restrictions. Assuming that the three elements of ε it are 
orthogonal and using a normalization, so that each has a unit variance, gives us 
3(3+1)/2 = 6 restrictions, with Var(ε it) = I. The last three restrictions come from the 
                                                 
10 For the CFA countries, M1 is measured as checking deposits at banks located in a certain country, 
plus currency issued in that country. Currency issued is a proxy for currency in circulation, but the 
limited data on billets deplacés (notes issued in one country that end up in another) suggest that this is 
a reasonable approximation.   10
assumption that γ (L) is lower-triangular. In other words, we assume that in the long run, 
conditional on the terms of trade, the growth of the real exchange rate is independent of 
output and money growth, and output is independent of money growth. The real 
exchange rate restrictions can be motivated by the assumption that relative PPP holds 
(at least in growth rates) in the long run, for which there is African evidence in Lowrey 
(1995). The final restriction is based on the assumption that aggregate supply growth is 
independent of monetary shocks in the long run. 
Altogether, then, we have five integration measures: Tij,  uij
p,  uij
y,  ε ij
p and ε ij
y. The 
following sections discuss how we investigate the possibility that these measures are 
dependent on whether two countries have a fixed exchange rate or share the same 
currency, conditional on geographical and economic characteristics. 
4  The impact of the CFA on trade 
Our first set of estimates relates to trade intensity, Tij. The Tij measure (the total bilateral 
trade volume in US Dollars) is constructed for two periods: 1981-90 and 1991-2000. 
The basic form of our trade intensity regression in each case is: 
) , , , , , ( ij ij ij ij j i ij u X ifz ifs D D f T =         ( 5 )  
where uij is a residual, and Xij a vector of conditioning variables. Di is a dummy variable 
for the i
th country. It turns out that country-specific effects have a large part to play in 
predicting trade intensity, and it might not necessarily be the case that the economic 
characteristics contained in the X-vector fully capture these effects. In other words, we 
will allow for unobserved country-specific characteristics to affect the size of Tij. These 
characteristics might incorporate a range of factors. For example, Rose and van 
Wincoop (2001) and Anderson and van Wincoop (2001) suggest that it is important to 
take account of the magnitude of each country’s barriers to trade with all its trading 
partners. This is a factor that is difficult to measure in our sample of countries with very 
limited fiscal data. 
The  X-vector comprises a number of economic characteristics. To the extent that 
integration is a function of the volume of bilateral trade flows, the explanatory variables 
in ‘gravity’ models of international trade will enter into X: 
(i)  The log-product of the two countries’ total GDP (in US Dollars): yi·yj 
(ii)  The log-product of their populations: pi·pj 
(iii)  A dummy variable for whether the countries share a land border: ifbij 
(iv)  The logarithm of the Great Circle distance between their capital cities (in 
radians): distij 
(v)  A dummy variable for whether the two countries have a maritime coastline: ifcij 
Figures for (i-iii) are taken from the World Bank World Development Indicators. 
However, these conditioning variables might also affect the magnitude of 
macroeconomic integration for other reasons. For example, larger or more developed 
countries might be less susceptible to speculative behaviour that induces unanticipated   11
deviations in the real exchange rate; so real exchange rate volatility might be lower. In 
this paper, we do not attempt to identify the channels through which the conditioning 
variables impact on our macroeconomic integration measures. 
There are two reasons for suspecting that estimation of the parameters of a linear form 
of equation (5) by least-squares will be inappropriate. First, many of the Tij observations 
are equal to zero (see Table 3); so it is likely that a Tobit regression will be more 
appropriate than the equivalent linear form. Second, the ifsij and ifzij dummies appear in 
equation (5) in order to capture the possibility that sharing a common currency (or 
having a fixed exchange rate) reduces transactions costs in international trade, as 
outlined above. In this sense, they have a role similar to the variables in the equation 
reflecting the determinants of international transport costs: ifbij, distij and ifcij. A simple 
version of equation (5) might treat the four cost variables as linearly separable 
arguments of f(). However, in the light of comments by, for example, Persson (2001), 
the linearity assumption is questionable. The magnitude of the impact of a common 
currency (or of a fixed exchange rate) on trade between two countries could depend on 
the size of transport costs, if only because larger transport costs could increase the size 
of the currency transactions involved, ceteris paribus. But also, the magnitude of 
informal barriers to trade might depend on the two elements of costs – for transport and 
for currency transactions – in a more complex way. For this reason, it might be more 
appropriate to fit a form of equation (5) that includes terms interacting ifsij and ifzij with 
the other cost variables: 
ij ij ij ij ij ij ij ij ij ij ij
ij ij ij ij ij j i j i j j i i ij
ij ij ij
u ifc ifs dist ifs ifc ifz dist ifz ifb ifz
ifc dist ifb ifs ifz p p y y D D T
T T T
+ ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ +
+ + + + + + + + =
> =
] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
*
0 ) log( | * ) log(
2 1 3 2 1
5 4 3 2 1 2 1
δ δ γ γ γ
η η η η η β β θ θ  (6) 
Table 3 
Dependent variable descriptive statistics 
 
(i) Trade: Tij 
  fraction of obs. > 0  log mean of obs. > 0  log std dev. of obs. > 0 
 1980s  1990s  1980s  1990s  1980s  1990s 
one country outside CFA  0.79 0.93  10.71 10.65 0.38  0.41 
UEMOA-UDEAC pairings  0.86 0.97  10.28 10.65 0.51  0.57 
single currency pairings  0.87 0.97  13.28 13.14 0.54  0.60 
(ii) Price and output correlations 
The reported figures are mean values, with standard deviations in parenthesis. 




single currency pairings 
f(corr(εi
p, εj
p))  -0.03 (0.39)  0.17 (0.40) 0.23  (0.44) 
f(corr(εi
y, εj
y))  0.15 (0.39)  0.15 (0.29) 0.05  (0.38) 
f(corr(ui
p, uj
p)) -0.06  (0.37)  0.16  (0.40) 0.24  (0.49) 
f(corr(ui
y, uj
y))  0.00 (0.47)  0.12 (0.37) 0.16  (0.43) 
number of observations  70  35  31 
   12
Table 4 
Tobit regression results for Tij 
The regression equations also include fixed effects. 
 
LR test for Tobit with linear arguments vs. non-linear model (1980s): 
χ
2(5) = 07.44 [0.190] 
 
LR test for Tobit with linear arguments vs. non-linear model (1990s): 
χ
2(5) = 14.58 [0.012] 
1980s      
variable   coeff.     s.e.   t ratio    prob.   coeff.    s.e.   t ratio    prob. 
pi.pj  -0.08661   0.10074   -0.860   0.3918   
yi.yj   0.00348   0.09392    0.037   0.9705   
ifcij  -0.13173   0.45852   -0.287   0.7744   
ifsij  -0.20570   0.30229   -0.680   0.4976   
ifzij   1.88630   0.48366    3.900   0.0002   1.86310   0.44649    4.173   0.0001 
ifbij   1.15060   0.30728    3.744   0.0003   1.15610   0.23941    4.829   0.0000 
distij  -0.00702   0.00932   -0.753   0.4532   
σ    0.32007   0.02246   14.254   0.0000   0.31846   0.02236   14.246   0.0000 
        
log-lik. -206.5    -207.4   
     
1990s      
variable   coeff.    s.e.   t ratio    prob.   coeff.    s.e.   t ratio    prob. 
pi.pj   0.25962   0.09933    2.614   0.0103   0.23677   0.09832    2.408   0.0177 
yi.yj  -0.31900   0.10085   -3.163   0.0020  -0.28429   0.09780   -2.907   0.0044 
ifcij   0.60560   0.46618    1.299   0.1967   
ifsij   1.05590   0.86601    1.219   0.2254   
ifzij  -1.00030   0.90488   -1.105   0.2715   
ifbij   0.45976   0.41701    1.103   0.2727   0.70984   0.38808    1.829   0.0700 
distij  -0.03266   0.01060   -3.082   0.0026  -0.02342   0.00902   -2.596   0.0107 
ifc.ifsij  -0.52189   0.54242   -0.962   0.3382   
ifc.ifzij  -0.37906   0.46095   -0.822   0.4127   
ifb.ifzij   1.29040   0.62511    2.064   0.0414   1.17400   0.45701    2.569   0.0115 
dist.ifsij  -0.04403   0.03140   -1.402   0.1637   
dist.ifzij   0.04736   0.02063    2.295   0.0237   0.02753   0.01080    2.548   0.0122 
σ    0.50524   0.03194   15.819   0.0000   0.49028   0.03101   15.809   0.0000 
     
log-lik.  -161.5      -165.6   
 
where Tij* is the latent variable in a Tobit regression. The logarithmic transformation is 
used because the positive values of Tij are approximately log-normally distributed. Note 
that while ifzij is interacted with ifbij, ifsij is not. This is because there is only one case of 
a land border between a UEMOA country and a UDEAC country (Niger and Chad). 
For these reasons we proceed according to the following modelling strategy. We first fit 
both a Tobit with non-linear arguments, as in equation (6), and one with only linear 
arguments (k γ k = δ k = 0) to the trade intensity data for each period (the 1980s and the 
1990s). We then calculate an LR test statistic for the joint significance of the non-linear   13
terms. These statistics are reported in Table 4. It turns out that the linear form can be 
rejected for the 1990s, but not for the 1980s. For this reason, the 1980s regression 
equation reported in the table has only linear arguments, but the 1990s regression 
equation includes the interaction terms. 
Table 4 lists the estimated coefficients for each explanatory variable alongside the 
corresponding standard error and the resulting t-ratio. The final row in the table reports 
the estimated residual variance, σ . For both sample periods (the 1980s and the 1990s) 
the table includes two regression equations. The first is unrestricted, but the second is a 
more parsimonious form in which a subset of the conditioning variable coefficients have 
been set to zero so as to minimize the Hannon-Quinn Information Criterion. Those 
coefficients that are statistically significant in the unrestricted equation do not change 
substantially in the restricted one, so we can be reasonably confident that our inferences 
are robust to the inclusion of nuisance parameters in the model.  
For the 1980s regression equation, there are just two significant explanatory variables in 
addition to the country fixed effects: the land border dummy ifbij and the CFA 
membership dummy ifzij. The coefficients on these two variables are both quite large 
(around 1.2 and 1.9 respectively), so both CFA membership and geographical proximity 
appear to have made a substantial difference to trade volumes. However, the common 
currency dummy ifsij is not statistically significant. In other words, when we consider 
trade volumes over the whole decade of the 1980s, there was no robust common 
currency effect on trade over-and-above the CFA membership effect. Moreover, the 
insignificance of the interaction terms in the regression implies that the effects of CFA 
membership, substantial as they were in the 1980s, did not depend on any geographical 
characteristics. 
For the 1990s regression, the picture is slightly more complex. Again it is the ifzij term 
rather than the ifsij term that is statistically significant. However, in this case the 
significant effect appears in the interaction terms ifzij.ifbij and ifzij.distij. There is a 
positive coefficient on ifzij.distij that is insignificantly different from the negative 
coefficient on distij. In other words, greater distance reduces trade volumes (with an 
elasticity of about 3 per cent) except when the two countries are CFA members, in 
which case distance has no significant effect. The coefficients on ifbij and ifzij.ifbij are 
both positive: the estimated coefficients are equal to around 0.5 and 1.2 respectively. In 
other words, sharing a common land border increases trade volumes, ceteris paribus, 
but the effect is much larger among CFA members.  
The overall implication of the fitted model for the 1990s is that the CFA membership 
effect is greatest for very close neighbours, but also quite large for very distant 
countries. In the case of close neighbours, CFA membership substantially reduces the 
barriers to trade inherent in the existence of a political boundary: it attenuates the ‘pure 
border’ effect. In the case of very distant countries, common membership of the CFA 
represents an institutional link that creates a basis for trade between countries that 
would otherwise have little or nothing to do with one another. That the non-linearities 
apparent in the fitted model for the 1990s are not significant in the fitted model for the 
1980s is not entirely surprising. As indicated in Table 3, the total volume of intra-
African trade was lower in the 1980s, and in the 1980s data there are far more instances 
of zero reported trade, especially among the non-CFA trade pairs. As a consequence 
there is rather less sample variation to explain in the 1980s data, especially at the lower 
end, and what variation there is can be explained by a simple intercept dummy. Overall,   14
the effect of CFA membership on trade implicit in the regression equations is greater for 
the 1980s than for the 1990s, as one might expect given the prevalence of distortionary 
trade policies in anglophone countries in the earlier period.11  
5  The impact of the CFA on real exchange rate and output correlations 
In this section we consider the impact of CFA membership on cross-country 




p and ε ij
y. First of all, we estimate the parameters in equations (1-4), 
using annual data reported in the World Bank World Development Indicators. Data are 
available for all countries at least for the period 1968-99, with the exception of the 
Central African Republic, where National Accounts data end in 1991. For some 
countries, data are available from as early as 1963. In all cases, the model parameters 
(and the resulting pairwise correlations) are estimated on as large a sample as possible. 
Our main interest is in the shocks implicit in the model, which are depicted in Figures 
2-7. Corresponding summary statistics are given in Table 3. 
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11 These stylized facts are still true if one uses individual years’ trade data, instead of ten-year totals. For 
some individual years, there are significant terms in the ifs dummy, indicating a common currency 
effect over-and-above the CFA membership effect. However, this difference is not statistically 
significant in regression equations for trade over longer time horizons.   15
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Figure 7: ε it
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y (■) time series 
 
It can be seen from the table that in three out of four cases (the exception being ε it
y), the 
unconditional correlations are higher for UEMOA-UDEAC pairs than for pairs with at 
least one country outside the CFA, and those for single currency pairs are even higher. 
However, the time-series model from which these innovations have been constructed 
conditions only on money and terms of trade shocks. There might also be time-invariant 
country-specific characteristics that affect the size of the correlations. In the light of the 
discussion in section 2, we ought also to condition on the distance/transport cost 
variables used for the trade regression, and also on some measures of the extent of 
heterogeneity in economic structure. The two measures that we shall use in the 
regressions reported below are the absolute values of the difference between i and j in 
(i) the ratio of agricultural value added to GDP, |ai – aj| and (ii) the ratio of industrial 
value added to GDP, |di – dj|. Figures are again taken from World Development 
Indicators. We estimate the impact of the CFA on real exchange rate and output 
correlations, conditional on these factors, by means of regression equations of the form: 
f(corr(qi,qj)) = φ 1·ifzij + φ 2·ifsij + φ 3·ifbij + φ 4·ifcij + φ 5·distij + φ 6·|ai – aj| + φ 7·|di – dj| + vij
q (7) 











  is a residual, and all variables have been orthogonalized with respect to 
country fixed effects (Di,Dj). The logistic transformation is used to ensure that the 
dependent variable distributions are unbounded. Note that this is a linear regression 
equation; we will see presently that there are no statistically significant non-linearities in 
the cross-country correlations for the macroeconomic shocks. Note also in Figures 2-7 
that the 1994 devaluation shows up very markedly in the innovation time series for 
many of the CFA countries. The regressions reported below use measures of the 
dependent variables that exclude the 1994 observations, on the grounds that the 
devaluation was an atypical shock to the CFA macroeconomies that is unlikely to be   18
repeated. If the 1994 observations are included, the stylized facts discussed below are 
even more marked. 
Equation (7) does not include log(Tij) as an explanatory variable. It is possible to include 
the trade volume measure in the regression, using the explanatory variables in Table 4 
as instruments. However, log(Tij) is not statistically significant in any of these four 
regressions. This suggests that the impact on CFA membership on real exchange rate 
and output correlations is through channels other than increased trade. 
Tables 5 and 6 report the regression results. For each of the four correlation measures, 
the table includes both a restricted and unrestricted version of equation (7). The 
restricted model allows the omission any variable except the dummy variables ifsij and 
ifzij. The unrestricted version minimizes the Akaike Information Criterion, but the 
restricted version minimizes the Hannon-Quinn Criterion. In any case, the significant 
coefficients in the unrestricted model are very similar to those in the restricted model, so 
the choice of model specification does not substantially alter the inferences we make. 
Because the residuals in each regression are correlated with each other, the OLS 
estimator for the restricted model differs from the Maximum Likelihood estimator; we 
report the latter. The summary statistics in Table 6 indicate that the regression residuals 
are normally distributed and homoskedastic. Ramsey RESET tests for the validity of our 
functional form (testing the significance of powers of vij
q up to the fourth order in the 
regression equations) indicate that the linear model is acceptable. 
The dummy variable ifzij is significant in three out of four of the regression equations – 
all except corr(ε i
y,ε j
y). In no equation is the ifsij dummy significant; in other words, the 
impact of CFA membership on these correlations appears to be a consequence of the 
fixed exchange rate rather than monetary union per se. In this respect, the results are 
similar to those for trade intensity. 





coefficient on the ifzij dummy is equal to about 0.3. This means that the expected 
difference between the correlations inside the CFA and those outside the CFA, 
conditional on other variables in the model, is roughly 0.15. For the real exchange rate 
correlation, the only other significant variable is the coastline dummy, ifcij, with a 
coefficient also equal to about 0.3. The natural interpretation of this effect is that lower 
transport costs reduce the magnitude of deviations from PPP. In the reduced-form 
output correlation regression, the distance variable, distij, and the economic structure 
variable, |ai – aj|, are statistically significant, with coefficients equal to –0.12 and –0.55 
respectively. In this case the correlation appears to depend not only on transport costs, 
but also on the degree of similarity with respect to agriculture’s share of GDP. 





y). The CFA dummy coefficient in the corr(ε i
p,ε j
p) regression is about 
twice as big as in the corresponding regression for corr(ui
p,uj
p); but the coefficient in the 
corr(ε i
y,ε j
y) regression is insignificantly different from zero. This suggests that the 
dependency of the reduced-form output correlations on common CFA membership is 
solely a consequence of the fact that the fixed nominal exchange rate reduces the size of 
asymmetric shocks to the real exchange rate equations (ε it
p) for each country. In other 
words, there is strong evidence for the importance of the CFA in terms of integration 
concept (ii) in section 2 above, but no evidence for the importance of the CFA in terms 
of integration concept (iii).   19
Table 5 
FIML regression results for real exchange rate and output correlations 
All variables have been orthogonalized with respect to fixed effects. 
corr(εi
p, εj
p)    
variable   coeff.  s.e.  t  ratio prob. coeff.  s.e.  t  ratio  prob. 
ifcij   +0.0222  0.1636  +0.136  0.8923       
ifbij   +0.2526  0.1157  +2.183  0.0308 +0.1453  0.0803  +1.811  0.0724 
distij   +0.0743  0.0691  +1.074  0.2847         
|ai-aj|   -0.0137  0.4329  -0.032  0.9749         
|di-dj|   -0.4174  0.3176  -1.314  0.1911         
ifsij   -0.0265  0.1134  -0.234  0.8154 -0.0333  0.1024  -0.325  0.7457 
ifzij   +0.6029  0.1698  +3.550  0.0005 +0.5939  0.1652  +3.594  0.0005 
                   
σ     +0.3687       +0.3691      
                   
corr(εi
y, εj
y)           
Variable   coeff.  s.e.  t  ratio prob. coeff.  s.e.  t  ratio  prob. 
ifcij   -0.1582  0.1462  -1.083  0.2607       
ifbij   -0.0208  0.1034  -0.201  0.7312       
distij   +0.0044  0.0618  +0.071  0.9349         
|ai-aj|   +0.2959  0.3868  +0.765  0.4457         
|di-dj|   +0.1305  0.2837  +0.460  0.6465         
ifsij   -0.1328  0.1013  -1.312  0.1918 +0.0881  0.0956  +0.922  0.3582 
ifzij   -0.0212  0.1517  -0.140  0.8361 -0.0497  0.1453  -0.342  0.7330 
                   
σ     +0.3294       +0.3283      
                   
corr(ui
p,uj
p)           
Variable   coeff.  s.e.  t  ratio prob. coeff.  s.e.  t  ratio  Prob. 
ifcij   +0.3187  0.1675  +1.903  0.0593 +0.3290  0.1394  +2.359  0.0198 
ifbij   +0.1522  0.1184  +1.285  0.2011       
distij   +0.0934  0.0708  +1.320  0.1893         
|ai-aj|   +0.4529  0.4432  +1.022  0.3087         
|di-dj|   -0.4446  0.3251  -1.368  0.1738         
ifsij   +0.0465  0.1160  +0.401  0.6891  -0.0287 0.1055 -0.272 0.7860 
ifzij   +0.3201  0.1738  +1.842  0.0678 +0.2872  0.1688  +1.702  0.0911 
                 
σ     +0.3775       +0.3773      
                   
corr(ui
y,uj
y)           
Variable   coeff.  s.e.  t  ratio prob. coeff.  s.e.  t  ratio  Prob. 
ifcij   +0.0866  0.1737  +0.498  0.6191       
ifbij   +0.0358  0.1228  +0.292  0.7711       
distij   -0.0892  0.0734  -1.215  0.2264 -0.1230  0.0508  -2.423  0.0167 
|ai-aj|   -0.3560  0.4596  -0.775  0.4400 -0.5478  0.3007  -1.822  0.0707 
|di-dj|   -0.0225  0.3372  -0.067  0.9469         
ifsij   -0.0359  0.1203  -0.298  0.7662 -0.1119  0.0829  -1.349  0.1796 
ifzij   +0.3621  0.1803  +2.008  0.0467 +0.3681  0.1713  +2.149  0.0335 
                 
σ     +0.3915       +0.3866      
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Table 6 
Descriptive statistics for the Table 5 regressions 
 
Regression residual correlations 
(Lower diagonal: unrestricted model; upper diagonal: restricted model) 
 











p)            -0.0413    0.51733    0.12617 
 corr(εi
y,εj
y)        -0.02493                   0.06562      0.51549 
 corr(ui
p,uj
p)         0.50864       0.07109                  0.15054 
 corr(ui
y,uj
y)         0.12791       0.52277      0.14737 
 
Correlation of actual and fitted values (unrestricted model) 
 









  correlation       0.37398    0.20008    0.31235    0.25606 
 
     Unrestricted Model    Restricted Model 
log-likelihood         605.93          600.13 
Hannan-Quinn Criterion         -8.2553              -8.5445 
Akaike Criterion           -8.9107          -8.8254 
 
Residual Normality Test         p = 0.92          p = 0.90 
Heteroskedasticity Test        p = 0.52          p = 0.39 
 
R
2(LR)              0.3010   
 
RESET (order 2)  eq. 1         p = 0.49 
      eq. 2         p = 0.88 
      eq. 3         p = 0.41 
      eq. 4         p = 0.68 
RESET (order 3)  eq. 1         p = 0.46 
      eq. 2         p = 0.93 
      eq. 3         p = 0.61 
      eq. 4         p = 0.32 
RESET(order 4)  eq. 1         p = 0.64 
      eq. 2         p = 0.66 
      eq. 3         p = 0.41 
      eq. 4         p = 0.52 
6  Summary and conclusion 
In this paper we have explored the factors that determine the degree of macroeconomic 
integration in West Africa. Our sample of countries includes, but is not restricted to, 
countries in the two monetary unions that make up the CFA Franc Zone. These two 
monetary areas share a common peg to the French Franc/Euro. Consequently, when we 
consider pairwise measures of integration, we have examples of countries sharing a 
single currency, of countries with different currencies but a hard exchange rate peg, and 
of countries between whose currencies’ bilateral exchange rate has been flexible. Our 
aim has been to see whether sharing a common currency delivers an extra degree of 
macroeconomic integration, as compared with sharing a common peg, and whether the 
peg delivers more integration than do flexible exchange rates. Five indicators of 
integration are considered, including measures of trade intensity, real exchange rate 
correlation and business cycle synchronicity.   21
For a wide variety of measures the exchange rate peg delivers more integration than a 
flexible exchange rate. The differences are statistically significant and economically 
substantial. In the case of trade integration, the size of the difference depends on 
geographical factors reflecting international transportation costs. The extra trade that 
CFA membership delivers is greatest among countries that share a common land border. 
For more distant trading partners the effect of the single currency is smaller (though still 
statistically significant). However, in no case is there a significant difference between 
the level of integration between CFA members in different monetary unions and the 
level of integration between monetary union partners. In this respect, the division of the 
CFA into two separate monetary areas appears to be of little economic consequence. 
Other authors, on the basis of cross-country and panel data spanning the whole world, 
have claimed that there is evidence for a link between macroeconomic integration and 
countries’ exchange rate regime. We have estimated the magnitude of this effect 
specifically for West Africa, one of the poorest parts of the world, and found that the 
effect substantial, though not always linearly separable from other economic 
characteristics. 
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